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About the Report
SPARC (the Scholarly Publishing and Academic Resources Coalition) is a global 
coalition that works to enable the open sharing of research outputs and educational 
materials in order to democratize access to knowledge, accelerate discovery, and 
increase the societal and economic return on our collective investment in research 
and education. As a catalyst for action, SPARC focuses on promoting changes to 
both infrastructure and culture needed to make open the default for research and 
education.
This report was commissioned in response to the growing trend of commercial 
acquisition of critical infrastructure in our institutions. It is intended to provide a 
comprehensive look at the current players in this arena, their strategies and potential 
actions, and the implications of these on the operations of our libraries and home 
institutions. It also outlines suggestions for an initial set of strategic responses for the 
community to evaluate in order to ensure it controls both this infrastructure and the 
data generated by/resident on it. 
To produce this analysis were fortunate to secure the services of Claudio Aspesi, 
a respected market analyst with more than a decade of experience covering the 
academic publishing market for international investors. Between 2004 and 2016, 
Aspesi was the Senior Research Analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein covering European 
Media Stocks. The academic publishing market – and Reed Elsevier and Pearson in 
specific – was a key area focus for him during his tenure. Previously he was Global 
Senior Vice President of Strategy at EMI Music and was responsible for defining 
EMI’s business model as the music industry entered the digital age. Before joining 
EMI in 2002, Claudio was a member of the executive team at Airclic, an Internet 
infrastructure company and, prior to that, a partner at McKinsey and Co., working with 
many leading media and entertainment companies.
Aspesi produced this comprehensive analysis in close collaboration with the SPARC 
team, after conducting interviews with dozens of key stakeholders including provosts, 
CIO’s, library leaders, students, and higher education administrators in a wide variety 
of North American institutions, as well as publishers, and other market experts. 
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We are at a critical juncture where there is a pressing need for the academic 
community – individually and collectively – to make thoughtful and deliberate 
decisions about what and whom to support – and under what terms and conditions. 
These decisions will determine who ultimately controls the research and education 
process; and whether we meaningfully address inequities created by legacy players 
or simply recreate them in new ways. These decisions will shape libraries’ role in the 
scholarly enterprise, now and for the future.
Report authors
Claudio Aspesi (lead author)
Nicole Allen
Raym Crow
Shawn Daugherty
Heather Joseph
Joseph McArthur
Nick Shockey
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Summary
Academic publishing is undergoing a major transition as some of its leaders are 
moving from a content-provision to a data analytics business. This is evidenced by a 
change in the product mix that they are selling across higher education institutions, 
which is expanding beyond journals and textbooks to include research assessment 
systems, productivity tools, online learning management systems – complex 
infrastructure that is critical to conducting the end-to-end business of the university.
 
Through the seamless provision of these services, these companies can invisibly 
and strategically influence, and perhaps exert control, over key university decisions 
– ranging from student assessment to research integrity to financial planning. Data 
about students, faculty, research outputs, institutional productivity, and more has, 
potentially, enormous competitive value. It represents a potential multi-billion-dollar 
market (perhaps multi-trillion, when the value of intellectual property is factored in), 
but its capture and use could significantly reduce institutions’ and scholars’ rights to 
their data and related intellectual property. A set of companies is moving aggressively 
to capitalize on this data, often by exploiting the decentralized nature of academic 
institutions. 
 
This shift is still in its early days. There are actions and strategies that institutions 
can consider adopting, both individually and collectively, to limit the potential harms 
posed by this trend, and to leverage potential benefits. These range from simple risk 
mitigation actions – such as revising existing data policies, establishing coordination 
mechanisms, negotiating to ensure institutional ownership of the data and 
infrastructure and establishing open terms and conditions – to larger, more strategic 
actions like re-thinking the institution’s relationship to its data in terms of commercial 
exploitation, IP ownership, and research investment outcomes. 
 
This document is designed to provide higher education leaders with an analysis of 
the leading commercial players’ strategies in this domain, the implications of those 
strategies, and a preliminary set of possible broad-stroke strategies that higher 
education institutions might consider taking to secure outcomes consistent with their 
own values and goals. 
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THE ACADEMIC 
PUBLISHING INDUSTRY 
IN 2018
Twenty-plus years into online distribution, and thirty-plus years since the first digital 
products first became available commercially, the academic publishing industry is 
undergoing a massive adaptation process. At first glance, academic publishing should 
have shared the traits of most Business to Business (B2B) media businesses after 
the transition to digital products and services: concentrated supply (protected by 
scale economies in sales and distribution and high barriers to entry), strong pricing 
power (driven by oligopolistic supply and by inelastic demand), and rising profitability. 
While the industry has indeed experienced these trends, fault lines are appearing 
everywhere, forcing the publishers to pursue different strategies from the past, which 
have massive – and potentially negative – implications for the academic community.
These fault lines are driven by media usage behavior which is familiar to consumers. 
Very much like cable TV viewers “cutting the cord” on their subscriptions, college 
students are lowering their spending on textbooks by renting them or purchasing 
them from the second-hand market; librarians, for their part, are taking tougher 
stances when they negotiate the renewal of scholarly journal collections and are more 
willing to let subscriptions expire. At the same time, digital dissemination has enabled 
piracy to play an increasing role, in the form of gray market imports and counterfeit 
physical textbooks, as well as unlicensed downloads of digital copies. 
The response of the publishing industry has been predictable. On one hand, it has 
put some effort into protecting its copyrights through legal action; on the other 
hand, it has quietly started to lower prices (or the rate of price increases) to reflect 
the changing elasticity of demand. Many publishers have started to also adapt to 
new business models, in the hope that the industry can settle into a new equilibrium 
Background
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by embracing the equivalent of cable TV’s “skinny bundles” or the music industry’s 
streaming subscriptions. As a result, hybrid scholarly journals, which maintain their 
subscription model but accept Open Access (OA) publication fees (APCs), have taken 
a substantial share of APC spending, and textbook publishers are pushing a model 
they call “inclusive access” in the hope of recapturing student spending lost to the 
secondary market. Some publishers, however, understand that all these are actions 
are – essentially – palliative remedies. 
Elsevier, Pearson and Cengage in particular are transforming themselves into data 
analytics companies built atop their content, effectively adding ways to monetize it. 
None of these companies shows any inclination to abandon its traditional content 
business, and for sound reasons. These businesses are very large relative to the 
overall size of either company, and failure to sustain their profitability would have 
severe consequences for their respective valuations. In addition, without content 
these companies would have a much harder task building credible data offerings. As 
a result, the traditional journal business of Elsevier and the higher education textbooks 
of Pearson and Cengage are likely to stay for a long time in their respective portfolios. 
But the management teams of these companies clearly view the future as driven by 
adding the provision of data and data analytics services to their respective customers, 
rather than by growing only the traditional core business. 
By leading the shift of the publishing industry into supplying data services, however, 
Elsevier,  Pearson and Cengage (as well as other entrants, coming both from the 
publishing industry and from the information industry) are posing challenges for 
the academic community. Until now, these companies were – at worst – seen by 
institutions as an annoyance for selected communities within academia. Librarians 
complained about the cost of periodicals and talked about a “serials crisis”, but the 
impact on the overall budget of a university was well below half of a percentage 
point. Similarly, the high cost of textbooks was an issue for students, and in particular 
those coming from disadvantaged backgrounds, but scholarships and some forms of 
financial aid, as well as the used textbook market, tended to mitigate the problem. 
The move by publishers into the core research and teaching missions of colleges and 
universities, with tools aimed at evaluating productivity and performance, means that 
the academic community could lose control over vast areas of its core activities. In 
addition, the collection of massive amounts of data about faculty and students poses 
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a significant legal and reputational risk for institutions, along with potential privacy 
and security threats for individuals. 
It is important to underscore upfront that we are not opposing the use of data 
and data analytics in academic institutions. This project is aimed at ensuring that 
academic institutions retain control over the use of data and data analytics, that 
the use of data and data analytic tools is consistent with the goals of the academic 
community and that academic institutions are properly equipped to deal with the risks 
and implications posed by the rising amount of data being collected, analyzed, and 
used. 
9 2019 Landscape Analysis
RESEARCH
After a window between the late nineties of the 20th century and the mid-teens of the 
21st, when the STM industry grew its revenues by about 5% annually, available data 
suggests that the industry’s subscription revenue growth has slowed down to perhaps 
1-2%. OA revenues have been rising faster, lifting overall revenue growth to 3-4%, 
still below the growth rate of a decade ago, but introducing a new uncertainty over 
the future revenue trajectory of the industry. In 2018, STM (a publishers’ trade body) 
estimated that growth in the next few years would average 4% annually, suggesting 
that contracts were still being signed at about that annual growth rate, but this growth 
is contingent on the outcome of many unknowns. 
Will caps be introduced on APCs? Will hybrid journals remain viable? Will new 
contractual forms (offsets, R&P, P&R, etc.) lead to overall revenue growth? The 
paradox of the STM publishing industry is that it has very high visibility over its 
revenues in the next two to three years (because of multi-year contracts) and very 
little beyond this time frame. 
It is not surprising that many publishers would seek additional opportunities for 
revenue growth, and leveraging data and data analytics is the most obvious “next 
step” for companies that already own vast amounts of research data, both in terms of 
content and usage. 
Background - An Industry in Transition
10
 2019 Landscape Analysis
THE COMPANIES
The Basics
Elsevier is the name usually attributed to RELX Group’s Scientific, Technical, and 
Medical business. RELX Group (known until 2015 as Reed Elsevier) is a London-based 
provider of information, data, and analytical services for corporate, professional, and 
academic customers. Elsevier is RELX’s largest area of activity, accounting for 33.7% 
of its revenues but 40.5% of its profits. It is also the most profitable business within 
RELX’s portfolio, although Risk & Business Analytics is a close second. 
How well does Elsevier compete in journal publishing?
Elsevier is not the largest publisher of STM journals in terms of titles (Springer Nature 
Group publishes about 3,000 titles), but it has the largest journal revenues: Springer 
Nature Group had 2017 revenues of €1.64/$1.9 (at an exchange rate of 1.16) million, 
but about 30% of that was books, leaving journal revenues at about $1.333 million, 
well below Elsevier’s estimated $1.8 million. 
There is no undisputed source for market shares in the journal business. STM 
estimates that the journal market is worth about $10 billion. Assuming that 55% of 
Elsevier’s 2017 revenues came from journals, that translates into £1.363 million which 
– at the average exchange rate for the year – equals $1.756 million (a 17.5% market 
share). This number appears directionally correct, as the approximately 2,500 Elsevier 
journals account for about 9% of all journals published, and revenues per articles at 
Elsevier should be much higher than for the average of the industry¹. 
Elsevier
¹Revenues per article at Elsevier should be in the region of £3,100/$4,100 per article (we derive this 
number by taking 55% of the reported Elsevier revenues, which derive from journals, and dividing 
them by the 430,000 articles which, in 2018, Elsevier claimed it publishes every year). By comparison, 
the then CEO of Springer guided informally a few years ago in a meeting with investors that Springer 
(before the Nature Publishing Group merger) was earning about €2,000/$2,300 per article. This number 
will have risen thanks to the merger with Nature; at the same time, Elsevier has been lowering revenues 
per article. As a result, the gap is likely closing.
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Elsevier, however, attracts a disproportionate amount of attention within the academic 
community because of its profitability and its business practices. Elsevier operates at 
a 37% reported operating profit margin compared to Springer Nature which operates 
at a 23% margin. Elsevier has often pursued tone-deaf business practices, which have 
been viewed as a land grab by the academic community. For example, Elsevier has 
refused in many countries to sign offsetting deals for publishing Open Access articles 
in subscription journals and has also engaged in relentless lobbying activity in both 
the U.S. and Europe to extend copyright in novel directions. Elsevier now routinely 
bypasses librarians and attempts to strike deals with other offices within large 
academic institutions. In response to the concerns of its critics, Elsevier would argue 
that it enjoys record revenues and profitability for the following reasons: it manages 
itself well, researchers want to be published in their journals, it funds activities for 
Open Science and for integrity in research more than any other publisher, and it sells 
data analytics services because the academic and research communities need them. 
Both sides of this argument miss an essential point. The adversarial relationship 
between Elsevier and academic librarians (and some researchers) is an anachronism 
and a throwback to management practices that have long disappeared in virtually 
every other industry. The existence of SPARC, the periodic Elsevier boycotts from 
some groups of academics, and the announcements from European consortia (and, 
more recently, from the University of California) willing to lose access to Elsevier 
journals rather than agree to requested price increases all point to a flaw in how 
Elsevier (and some competitors) are run. 
Historically, Elsevier has pursued price increases in the region of 5% annually, 
and justified this request with the parallel 5% growth in articles it publishes. This 
argument is flawed for two reasons: it assumes that there are neither productivity 
gains nor scale economies anywhere in the business. The first part of the argument 
is surprising – if productivity at Elsevier does not rise, then management is not doing 
its job properly – and the second part of the argument is wrong – administration or 
IT staff does not rise just because more articles are published. In light of the financial 
pressure on academic library budgets, refusing to pass along some of the savings 
is strictly a commercial and business decision, but it does invite retaliation from 
customers when possible. We have seen that Elsevier is effectively reinvesting some 
of these gains in new products and services which offer no benefit to libraries, as 
they are targeted to other users within universities (and even to completely different 
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customers). In other words, librarians are asked to bear the financial burden of 
investments which will benefit some other category of customers, as well as the 
shareholders and management of Elsevier. 
Another issue with the request for an annual increase based on a larger number 
of articles published is the quality of those additional articles. Just because it is 
additional research does not make it equal in quality. In general, a large amount of 
published research may end up of limited or no use to subscribers. Data released by 
ten UK universities on readership in chemistry and life sciences journals show that 
50% of journals account for 5 to 10% of all article readership (Exhibits 1 and 2). This 
pattern applies to Elsevier journals as well: when New Mexico State University decided 
in 2010 not to renew one of its collection contracts with Elsevier, it published the data 
relating access to readership for the journals included in the collection (Exhibit 3). In 
the absence of obligations for leading journals to add articles at a pace that is at least 
in line with the overall growth rate of articles published, there is a significant risk that 
the average “quality” of the articles will decline. This, in turn, is a contentious issue for 
librarians asked to fund a growing number of journals and articles with no guarantee 
that their quality will be adequate.
Exhibit 1
Half of the journals in Life Sciences account for 5 to 7% of articles readership among 
ten UK universities…
Source: Research Information Network, analysis
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Exhibit 2
…and a similar ratio applies to chemistry journals.
Source: Research Information Network, analysis
Exhibit 3
The same distribution applies to Elsevier journals, as NMSU reported that 901 journals 
(out of 1333) were accessed once a month or less in the nine months before contract 
expiration.
Source: NMSU, analysis 
14
 2019 Landscape Analysis
Elsevier and the future of scholarly publishing – what strategy?
With this background in mind, it is no surprise that Elsevier is thinking about what the 
future may have in store. In spite of the fact that scale economies in the business 
would favor acquiring other publishers, in the past few years, Elsevier has not pursued 
significant acquisitions in academic journals. The company has invested, instead, to 
acquire platforms and tools which would broaden its range of products and allow the 
company to attract new customers beyond its traditional base of research libraries. 
In fact, in a 2015 investor presentation, Elsevier explicitly indicated its intent to 
increasingly serve university administrations, funding bodies, and governments with 
tools aimed at estimating and improving the productivity of research and optimizing 
funding decisions. 
These investments have not been huge, but have been much larger than would 
make financial sense. Press reports indicate that Mendeley and SSRN cost between 
£100 and 125 million ($130 and 165 million) and Bepress may have cost between 
$100 million and $130 million. Mendeley and SSRN have business models which are 
unlikely to ever become truly profitable as standalone entities, while Bepress was 
profitable at the time of the acquisition (but the price paid still looks very expensive). 
What is Elsevier’s strategy? 
Elsevier’s answer to this question has probably evolved over time. As we previously 
mentioned, it is not unusual for a company to enter a business or acquire assets 
with one strategy in mind and then broaden its scope as it learns more about the 
opportunities offered by the acquired business and as the industry landscape evolves. 
Several interviews have surfaced four themes which we believe are central to the 
future of Elsevier. 
1. Protect the core journal business. Elsevier must realize that Open Access (OA) is 
a significant threat to its economics, given that revenues per article today are in 
the region of £3,100/$4,100. Elsevier appears to have lowered its revenues/article 
over time (the total number of articles Elsevier publishes has grown by about 5% 
CAGR between 2006 and 2014, and reached about 430,000 in 2017), faster than its 
journal revenue growth of about 4% annually. Even so,  Elsevier faces a potentially 
significant decline in revenues in the case that a full transition to OA takes place, 
since several surveys and reports indicate that the industry average APC is in 
the region of $2,250 to $2,400. Elsevier could cut some costs to compensate for 
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lower revenues, but we estimate that, with current estimated costs per article in 
the region of $2,650, a 10-15% cut would only save about $250 to $400, well below 
the decline in revenues. Incidentally, research Bernstein conducted years ago with 
the collaboration of a scholarly journal publisher surfaced that a full transition to 
OA would lead to savings of 12.5% in its cost base, so a 10 to 15% cost reduction 
appears eminently reasonable. In this scenario, however, the operating profits of 
Elsevier would be wiped out almost completely, as both revenues and costs would 
converge around the $2,250 to $2,400 mark. The best way for Elsevier to protect 
its profitability to would be to gain a massive market share at the high end of 
the market that could and would pay for expensive APCs. This, in turn, would be 
easier if Elsevier could win larger and larger numbers of high quality submissions 
from authors. In this scenario, Elsevier might be able to publish more high impact 
articles thanks to early insights into the quality of research (for example, through 
access to the desktops of researchers through Mendeley).
2. Improve how Elsevier runs the journal business. Elsevier already holds one of 
the largest repositories of data on citations and readership through its various 
databases (from Scopus and Science Direct to Mendeley, SSRN, and Bepress). 
Simply put, the more data points Elsevier develops, the better it positions itself 
to gain insights into developments that will affect its competitive position in 
the future, often with an early advantage which may be measured in years. For 
example, Elsevier could identify, through the analysis of research and publication 
patterns and the quality and reach of their collaboration networks, which 
researchers are likely to grow into future leaders in their respective fields and offer 
them editorial board positions on their journals ahead of other publishers. Elsevier 
could also identify which segments of various disciplines are likely to evolve into 
the next growth area for research by looking (for example) at project participation 
patterns, size and quality of teams, and funding bodies’ decisions, targeting 
these segments with new, dedicated journals ahead of other publishers. Similarly, 
Elsevier could isolate in advance new trends in interdisciplinary studies, allowing 
it to establish publication forums where none exist today and even driving funding 
decisions which lead to accelerated growth for these types of research. Each 
of these levers could enhance the competitive position of Elsevier, particularly 
because the company has access to far more data on research patterns than any 
other publisher (except for Clarivate, which does not have access to content itself). 
 
16
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In addition to these strategic opportunities, there are more tactical ones, which 
may allow the company to run its operations better and at lower costs. For 
example, Elsevier could identify the editors best suited to work with specific 
authors to accelerate manuscript editing, or which peers are likely to respond 
faster and more constructively to requests for peer review on the basis of specific 
characteristics of articles. The possibilities are many and the opportunity for 
smaller publishers to replicate these advantages is almost nil because of Elsevier’s 
size and reach in the marketplace. 
3. Sell insights to universities, funding bodies and governments. The same insights 
that would allow Elsevier to offer editorial positions to rising star researchers or to 
launch new journals ahead of the competition are valuable to universities. Elsevier 
and Clarivate, as well as smaller competitors like Academic Analytics, already sell 
tools aimed at assessing the productivity of specific research. Some of these tools 
are relatively primitive, but it is reasonable to assume they will become better over 
time (interviews suggest that Clarivate is ahead of Elsevier in terms of quality, 
but Elsevier is working to fill the gap by offering to test their tools for free with 
leading research universities). In addition to driving resource allocation, these tools 
can also affect other core processes of universities. For example, the quality of 
published research (using the impact factor of journals as a proxy) has played a 
major role in hiring, promotion, and tenure decisions. Being able to better assess 
and predict the likely trajectory of Ph.D. candidates, research associates, and 
Assistant and Associate Professors would be of great value to the leadership of 
universities. Similarly, being able to target early on which emerging disciplines or 
subjects are most likely to grow in relevance (to the point of attracting significant 
incremental funding and students) would allow universities to improve the return 
on investment in new areas.  
 
Moreover, once these tools are deployed, the customers may find it difficult to 
discontinue usage for several reasons, including equity considerations (using the 
same assessment tools over time is encouraged in people-related processes, and 
lack of transparency on how algorithms work would make it difficult to substitute 
them). In general, the experience of the corporate sector is that users tend to rely 
on specific third-party data and find it difficult to abandon once it is embedded 
in their core processes. This means that these services can generate recurring 
revenues with strong pricing power, and Elsevier is uniquely positioned to offer 
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these services given its access to content and underlying data. 
4. Sell insights to industry or the investment community. This opportunity may be the 
most speculative, but it is also, by far, the most valuable. Elsevier, like any other 
STM publisher, sits on a massive amount of intellectual insights and – increasingly 
– data. To provide some general estimates, NASDAQ believes that about 30% of its 
market capitalization (currently about $3 trillion out of a total capitalization of $10 
trillion) is derived from academic research. It would make sense for Elsevier to try 
to capitalize on its early access to academic research (for example, by partnering 
with industry to exploit insights, or by establishing joint ventures with Venture 
Capital firms to improve the odds of VC investing). 
 
Elsevier seems well aware of the value of text and data mining, as it effectively 
attempts to prohibit text and data mining of articles outside of its own tools. It is 
possible that Elsevier only thinks of monetizing this value through the licensing 
of software that allows third parties to data mine articles and data repositories. 
One step in this direction is Elsevier’s recent launch of its Entellect platform, a 
product targeted at life sciences companies that combines access to proprietary 
company data, Elsevier databases, and academic literature to mine text and data 
and streamline the R&D process. On the other hand, Elsevier may realize that 
much more value can be realized by mining the text and data by itself and then 
selling insights to interested third parties. Our interviews with industry participants 
indicate that Elsevier’s is unlikely to take such a bold step, but it is entirely possible 
that management will see the opportunity at some point. 
What could derail Elsevier?
We see three major threats to Elsevier’s performance going forward and have laid 
them out below in what we estimate to be declining order of likelihood. 
1. Failure to properly execute their data strategy. For all the competitive advantages 
which Elsevier has, their data strategy carries some risks as well. First and 
foremost, Elsevier is viewed with suspicion within large segments of the academic 
community. The launch of this SPARC project, for example, is the result of 
continuing ill will between Elsevier and the academic community. Elsevier has 
made several efforts to mend fences through a variety of approaches, ranging 
from donations and sponsorships of academic programs and events to the steady 
effort to communicate its support for research values through members of the 
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academic community. Despite these efforts, Elsevier has made little headway, in 
part because – in parallel with these pacification efforts – it continues to lobby 
for additional copyright protection, it staunchly defends rights which are counter-
intuitive to academics (like refusing to allow text and data mining of articles with 
third party software), and it continues to demand price increases that are viewed 
as unreasonable and ignore the financial constraints of academic libraries.  
 
In addition to these issues, which may lead universities to exercise special care 
to control or cap the usage of Elsevier data tools and services, Clarivate appears 
to have a significant lead in the quality of its competing tools. Clarivate also has 
the following advantages: a reputation for independence, no journal business 
to protect, and ample funding to maintain their current high-quality leadership. 
Lastly, Clarivate has the advantage of carrying an Intellectual Property business 
in its portfolio, which may make it the natural winner in selling services tied to IP 
exploitation. 
2. A sudden collapse of subscription publishing. Historically, shifts in the scholarly 
communications industry have taken place at a glacial pace. Open access (OA) 
revenues were still less than $500 million in 2017, or about 5% of total industry 
revenues, 15 years after the Budapest Open Access Declaration was signed. Of 
course, revenues undercount the extent of the success of OA because they do 
not include articles funded in OA through other programs, or the large number 
of articles made available in OA through repositories rather than journals – the 
articles available in OA in any form are now closer to 30% annually and rising. 
However, revenue is what has traditionally mattered to subscription publishers.  
 
Nonetheless, a collapse cannot be ruled out completely. Should governments and 
private funding bodies in the U.S., Japan, and Western Europe agree to abandon 
embargo periods before mandatory deposit in open repositories as well as 
disqualify hybrid journals from fulfilling OA mandates (and prove willing to enforce 
their mandates by publicly excluding violators from future grants), publishers 
may see submissions to all but a handful of leading journals dry up quickly. The 
industry may then convert to a pure Gold OA model to secure revenues, but – as 
mentioned earlier – the relatively high cost structure of Elsevier leaves it poorly 
equipped to compete in a Gold OA industry. If this were to transpire, Elsevier would 
have to go through a lengthy period of restructuring, and – in the meanwhile – 
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financial markets would likely show their displeasure by shrinking the valuation of 
RELX Group, both because Elsevier earnings would collapse and because it would 
be difficult to see a path to recovery. 
 
Plan S may or may not lead to a full OA transition. The number (and spending) of 
the initial supporters is relatively modest, but more countries and funding bodies 
are expressing an interest in joining, at least in principle. Important issues remain 
open, however. Will a transition phase, allowing the publication of OA articles 
in hybrid journal, be allowed or not? For how long? What will trigger the sunset 
of such phase? Similarly, will caps to APCs be imposed? For how long? At what 
level? Just to be clear, an indefinitely long transition phase and/or the removal of 
any APC caps would decrease the impact of Plan S on subscription publishing; 
conversely, the outright banning of hybrid journals and the imposition of low caps 
on APCs would dramatically change the publishing landscape.  
 
In addition, piracy might force a change in the business model. While librarians 
are careful to point out that using Sci-Hub is not legal and that there are better 
(and legal) alternatives, awareness of Sci-Hub continues to grow. Elsevier has 
been at the forefront of legal action to squash Sci-Hub, but efforts, so far, have not 
been effective. The experience of other media business – first and foremost the 
recorded music industry – suggest that it is close to impossible to litigate violators 
of copyright out of existence, since they can take refuge in jurisdictions outside 
the reach of Western courts, and, even when a company is finally taken down, a 
new one can quickly rise to take its place, starting a new cycle of litigation. The 
lesson from the music industry should not be lost on the management of Elsevier 
(and other publishers): what finally put peer-to-peer services out of business 
was not a recourse to legal action or technical mechanisms to foil searches, 
but the introduction of music streaming services which offered a convenient, 
reasonably priced service that satisfied consumers. In this sense, the scholarly 
communications industry is fortunate to have a model ready at hand to adopt – 
OA – rather than needing to look for one and test it. It took about 15 years between 
the revenue peak of 1999 and the widespread adoption of Spotify for the music 
industry to find a way out of its decline, and it had the good fortune of finding two 
companies (Spotify and Apple) willing to incur losses for several years to launch 
and grow the service.  
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We pointed out earlier that Elsevier’s best defense in a fully OA world would be 
to win a disproportionate amount of high-quality submissions through predictive 
analytics. The other tool available to mitigate the impact of a shift to OA would 
be to add more value to articles than what other publishers can provide. Elsevier 
could try to facilitate search and access, streamline and accelerate editing and 
peer review, add personal recommendation and sharing tools, and justify higher 
APCs through demonstrable better usability of its journals and platforms. It is 
not by chance that Elsevier acquired Plum Analytics in February 2017, a leading 
provider of altmetrics, as well as Aries Systems (this deal was announced just 
at the beginning of August 2018). It would make sense for Elsevier to develop 
deep insights into how articles are used and demonstrate to researchers, funding 
bodies, and departmental heads the value of publishing with Elsevier (assuming, 
of course, that such value is demonstrable) to avoid being dragged in price 
competition with cheaper OA journals. 
3. Government intervention. Even if the current hybrid system remains in place, it is 
questionable why Elsevier refuses to enter offsetting deals in most countries. It is 
difficult to believe that governments offering subsidies for Gold OA publishing (as 
it happens in Western Europe) intend them as a mechanism aimed at increasing 
publishers’ revenues at the expense of taxpayers. It is a relatively minor issue 
compared to taxpayer subsidies of the energy or banking sectors, and it is unlikely 
to excite a populist backlash against Elsevier. On the other hand, because it is a 
somewhat arcane topic, it could be sufficient to find a handful of legislators or 
politicians in one country to adopt the cause and push for tough action. This could 
take many forms, such as excluding publishers who refuse to sign offset deals 
from receiving public funding for APCs or barring Elsevier from public contracts. 
Any governmental action would be litigated in court and would introduce further 
uncertainty and create a reputational risk which could affect the share price of 
Elsevier and force it to change course of action on OA.  
 
Similarly, Elsevier could be subject to anti-trust action. A complaint was lodged in 
October 2018 with the European Commission, alleging that RELX practices violate 
two articles of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. Whether the 
European competition authorities will pursue the case remains unclear at this 
stage, but the expansion of Elsevier’s activities into the provision of data analytics 
back to universities may raise further concerns.
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The Basics
The Springer Nature Group is the result of the 2015 merger of Springer 
Science+Business Media with the majority of the businesses owned by Holtzbrinck 
and operating as part of McMillan Science and Education. The company has two 
main shareholders: Holtzbrinck Group (a German family-owned publisher) which has 
53% of the shares, and BC Partners (a European private equity firm) which has the 
balance (except for a small stake still owned by the Government of Singapore, which 
owned Springer before its sale to BC Partners). The Springer/Nature merger was quite 
expensive: BC Partners acquired Springer in 2013 for an estimated €3.1 billion and 
then agreed to give Holtzbrinck 53% of the equity of the combined entity. If by January 
2015, when the Nature merger was announced, BC Partners valued its stake in 
Springer at least equally to its original investment, this means that Nature Publishing 
Group was valued at €3.5 billion, underlying the unique quality of its assets. 
Springer Nature Group is the single largest publisher of scholarly journals, with 
about 3,000 titles. In terms of revenues, however, Springer is second to Elsevier with 
estimated journal revenues of €1.150/$1.333 billion (30% of Springer’s reported 2017 
revenues of €1.64/$1.9 billion, in fact, derive from the sale of books). Its operating 
profit margin of 22.8% is also well below Elsevier’s 36.8%. 
Historically, Nature Publishing Group, the publisher of Nature, has been perceived 
as the highest quality group of scholarly journals. Springer, on the other hand, was 
always viewed as having a good but not outstanding portfolio of journals. Springer 
was the first publisher to embrace OA through its acquisition of BioMed Central in 
2008. At the time, the deal was viewed as an indication that OA would quickly gain 
traction among leading publishers. In the following years, however, Springer turned 
lukewarm on OA, and former CEO Derk Haank (who retired at the end of 2017) was 
publicly indicating by 2011 that he believed that the collection subscription (aka “big 
deal”) is “the best invention since sliced bread”. Regardless of whether one agrees 
with this statement, it is a good indication of the conservative and tough, business-
oriented culture of Springer. 
Springer Nature Group
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What is the strategy of Springer Nature?
Springer Nature under Derk Haank and its private equity owners has pursued a very 
traditional strategy, based on extracting synergies from industry consolidation. The 
merger with Nature Publishing Group gave Springer another large bucket of costs to 
cut on top of the relentless pressure on costs exercised by Haank over the years. It 
also absorbed a significant amount of management time, leaving little or no space for 
comprehensive initiatives on academic data and analytical services. In fact, its only 
recent noteworthy deal in research outside of the journal space has been lifting its 
stake in Research Square (a company that offers language and manuscript editing 
and translation services to authors of scientific content) to 60% in February 2018. 
Springer’s reluctance to enter the data analytics business may also be driven by 
the €3/$3.47 billion debt of the company. This debt equals about 5.5x EBITDA (as a 
comparison, RELX Group aims to keep its Net Debt/EBITDA ratio between 2.5x and 
3x and was at 2.5x at the interim six months 2018 results), a ratio that is dangerously 
close to becoming unsustainable. Investors view a Net Debt/EBITDA ratio of 6x or 
higher as dangerous, particularly at a time when interest rates may start to rise. 
Management will have probably tried to lengthen maturities and convert debt to fixed 
rate after the failed IPO (which was meant to raise €1.2/$1.4 billion, earmarked for 
debt reduction). Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine that, in the current environment, 
Springer could afford to shift its strategy to pursuing an Elsevier-like data analytics 
strategy, which would imply additional investments and losses for some time to 
come. 
Why did the IPO fail?
Very simply, the IPO of Springer Nature failed because of a valuation issue. The price 
range offered to investors (€10.50 to €14.50/share, equal to $12.17 to $16.80/share) 
implied a valuation of 8.8 to 12.2 times 2019 forecasted EBITDA. This assumes that 
2019 EBITDA will come in at about €600/$695 million (an almost 10% increase over 
the €551/$639 million EBITDA recorded in 2017). 
The upper end of this range would have been expensive under almost all 
circumstances, and even the lower end requires significant confidence that the 
business will continue to generate adequate revenue and earnings growth for many 
years to come. In the short term, this is a reasonable assumption, as earnings of 
scholarly publishers tend to have very low volatility because most customers sign 
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multi-year contracts with pre-defined price inflation terms. On the other hand, there 
are so many things that could go wrong with this model in the future (in particular 
because of the rising potential of a shift to Open Access), leading investors to have 
little faith in the value of forecasted long term earnings.
Our interviews indicate that some investors expected the stock to fall at least another 
10-15% after trading started following the IPO, effectively allowing them to buy it at a 
much more attractive valuation, in part because of the rising stream of negative news 
coming from both Springer and Elsevier on the negotiations of new subscriptions with 
leading European and North American customers. 
Going forward…
The board and management team of Springer Nature are now in a tight spot. It looks 
difficult to get anything close to the valuation they expect by just running the business 
as they have to date. Assuming investors will not accept a valuation higher than 
7x EBITDA, EBITDA must rise by 20% (+€120/$139 million) to €720/$835 million to 
achieve the lower end of the valuation range, and by about 75% (+€450/$522 million) 
to €1.050/$1217 billion to achieve the higher end of the range. After years of cost 
cutting, there is probably limited scope to radically lower the cost structure to achieve 
this goal: the company has about €1/$1.16 billion in operating costs (before interest, 
taxes, depreciation, and amortization), so even cutting €120/$140 million requires 
taking out another 10% of expenditures (and over 40% to take out €450/$522 million). 
Alternatively, management could try to lift the growth rate of the business. This 
option, however, looks difficult to execute for two reasons. As we discussed earlier, 
the company is saddled with significant debt (€3 billion) and this leaves little scope to 
invest in growth initiatives. In addition, some of the possible growth initiatives would 
add to the losses in the near term, further clouding the prospect of trying to IPO the 
business in 2019 or 2020. It is widely thought, for example, that Holtzbrinck did not 
include Digital Science into the assets of Springer Nature to avoid saddling it with 
the estimated €10 to 20 million ($11.6 to 23.2 million) in annual losses which Digital 
Science used to incur at the time (per our interviews – Holtzbrinck does not disclose 
numbers). Recently, however, Digital Science revenues are rising at a much faster 
pace (again, per our interviews), and this improvement in performance may lead to 
reconsideration over whether it should have a future role within Springer Nature (and, 
in fact, become a key element of the investment case in Springer Nature). 
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In the end, BC Partners, like all private equity (PE) firms, wants a liquidity event that 
will allow it to exit the investment. In many cases, PE firms do have the recourse of 
distributing to their investors the holdings in acquired assets, but this outcome is 
unpopular with investors and becomes a black mark on a PE firm. The size of Springer 
Nature may preclude a sale to another scholarly publisher on anti-trust concerns 
(although, in recent years, regulators have accepted mergers in sectors of the media 
industry which are even more concentrated, like recorded music). It seems unlikely 
that a traditional media company would want to step in and own a minority stake in 
a scholarly publisher. This leaves the Holtzbrinck family or an IPO as the only long 
term exits for BC Partners. The first course would require a significant effort by 
Holtzbrinck, who may have to part with other assets (or take a significant debt) to buy 
out BC Partners – both options appear unpalatable. An IPO remains, therefore, the 
most logical outcome, but valuation remains a sticky issue, as we have seen. It is also 
worth noting that the stock market is near its highs, raising the question of what can 
lift the appetite of investors for this asset. In summary, the timing for an IPO looks 
increasingly uncertain. 
Implications for the academic community
Elsevier is the net winner from the IPO’s failure. Had the IPO succeeded, Springer 
Nature would have had less debt, more flexibility to pursue growth through 
investments, and it could have also created an uncomfortable peer in the eyes of 
investors: a low valuation of Springer Nature would have raised questions on the 
valuation of RELX Group. In fact, the current RELX Group total market value (about 
£40.7/$53.8 billion, including its Net Debt of £6.2/$8.2 billion at the end of June 2018) 
implies a valuation of 14.5x the estimated 2018 EBITDA of £2.8/$3.7 billion. Since 
RELX Group derived about 40% of its 2017 operating profit from Elsevier, even a top 
of the range 12.2x valuation for Springer Nature would have raised a few questions 
about the RELX valuation – and a Springer Nature valuation at the bottom of the 
range at 8.8x much more so. Finally, a publicly listed Springer Nature would have 
provided a quarterly score card on the performance of Elsevier in terms of revenue 
growth and margins expansion – and any underperformance would have provided 
further problems for the management of Elsevier. Instead of facing all these issues, 
Elsevier stands alone among journal publishers in its strategy of transitioning towards 
serving the broad academic community on data analytics. Even if Springer Nature 
does, at some future point, take control of Digital Science, this move will be delayed. 
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A publicly-listed Springer Nature, with less debt, could have moved towards replicating 
Elsevier’s strategy, offering a welcome alternative to dealing with Elsevier. This 
opportunity now looks more remote in time, if at all feasible, leaving Clarivate as the 
only likely competitor to Elsevier in data analytics going forward. 
The Basics
Wiley is the smaller of the three main journal publishers. It publishes about 2,300 
journals, so – in terms of titles – it is very close in size to Elsevier. Journal revenues, 
however, are much lower: in the fiscal year that closed on the 30th April 2018, journal 
revenues totaled $901.5 million. This number is driven by the lower number of articles 
published: the company claims to publish only one third of the 500,000 articles 
submitted every year, translating into about 166,000, substantially fewer than the 
430,000 articles which Elsevier publishes; in terms of revenues per article, both Wiley 
and Springer Nature now appear to earn more than Elsevier (Exhibit 5). 
Wiley
Publisher
Exhibit 5
Revenues per article, 2017
Elsevier (£)
Springer Nature (€)
Wiley ($)
Journal
revenues
1,363,000,000
1,164,400,000
901,500,000
Articles
published
430,000
300,000
166,000
Revenues / 
article
3,170
3,881
5,431
Revenues / 
article ($)
4,089
4,386
5,431
Source: Websites, annual reports, analysis
Research is the largest activity within Wiley, accounting for 52% of revenues (largely 
journals, with a small contribution from Atypon). Books account for 34%, and the 
balance derives from learning services (increasingly digital, but not exclusively). The 
company is publicly listed and led by an independent Board, but the Wiley family is 
still involved.
What is Wiley’s strategy?
Wiley’s acquisition in 2016 of Atypon for $120 million, at first glance, seems to 
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underline management’s belief that the traditional subscription business model 
will survive. We have modelled the deal based on the data made available by Wiley, 
supplemented by interviews. Based on these data points, Wiley would have to believe 
that Atypon could grow its standalone cash flow (i.e. the cash generated by the 
business for its previous owners, with no synergies) by 2% in perpetuity to justify the 
price.
We doubt that Wiley’s management is just taking unwarranted risks. Wiley could 
justify a very expensive valuation because of its synergies with Atypon. Our interviews 
suggest that Wiley never achieved a satisfactory digital distribution. Interscience was 
heavily overstaffed with as many as 400 FTE employees and may have cost Wiley 
as much as $60 million/year. If Wiley could save only two thirds of its Interscience 
costs and it lost all external revenues, the deal would still make sense financially. 
Of course, this conclusion hinges on several assumptions. The greatest sensitivity 
is to the actual costs savings, which in turn depend on the number of Interscience 
employees at the time of the deal. If that number is directionally correct, then all other 
sensitivities are relatively minor. If we are correct, Wiley has invested substantial 
resources to eradicate an operational problem. This makes a lot of sense financially 
and operationally, but it also means that management has had less time (and 
resources) to think, develop, and execute a data strategy. 
The Basics
Clarivate is the name the new private equity owners (Onex and Baring Asia) gave 
to the assets previously owned by Thomson Reuters when they acquired them in 
2016 (but management had already decided to sell it by 2015). In our view, Thomson 
Reuters decided to sell the business for two reasons: it was small, relative to its 
portfolio at the time (Exhibit 6), and it was not providing the same reliable mid-single 
digit revenue growth it had enjoyed until a few years earlier (Exhibit 7). In addition, the 
management of Thomson Reuters believed that changes in the journal business and 
the rise of OA would add to uncertainty over the future business model, potentially 
putting pressure on valuations. At the same time, the business’ high profitability 
meant that a sale would generate substantial amounts of cash. 
Clarivate
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Exhibit 6
Science and IP accounted for only 8% of Thomson Reuters revenues…
Source: Annual report
Exhibit 7
…and, by 2016, its growth had slowed down considerably.
 Source: Earnings presentations
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The sale price ($3.55 billion) implied a valuation of about 11.5x 2017 EBITDA ($310 
million). At the time of the sale, the latest reported full year EBITDA (for the Fiscal 
Year 2015) was $313 million (and in 2016, when the assets were mostly owned by 
Thomson Reuters, the EBITDA was $315 million). At the end of 2018, the company 
carried a substantial amount of net debt ($2.007 million, slightly higher than the 
$1.965 million it reported at the end of 2016), implying a net debt/EBITDA of 6.5x 
(6.2x at the end of 2016), higher than the 5.5x of Springer Nature. This means 
that management operated under significant constraints in terms of investments. 
However, in January 2019 Clarivate announced that the company would merge with 
Churchill Capital Corp, becoming a public company listed at the NY Stock Exchange. 
The company guided that the transaction implied an entity value of $4.2 billion, with 
valuation of 12.5x 2019’s estimated EBITDA (implying a 2019 EBITDA of about $335 
million). Clarivate also disclosed that its net debt had declined to $1.3 billion thanks 
to the closing in Q4 2018 of the sale of its Intellectual Property Management business 
(in part offset by the acquisition of TrademarkVision). This means that the Net Debt/
EBITDA ratio of Clarivate has declined to about 3.9x – a ratio which is still high, but 
is more manageable and provides management with some room to invest going 
forward. 
What is Clarivate’s Strategy?
When Thomson Reuters owned the science business, it kept it separate for many 
years from its other assets in the space (healthcare and IP), pursuing a strategy 
narrowly aimed at serving libraries and academic institutions with leading tools which 
would be neutral in the eyes of its customers and the scholarly communications 
industry. After the disposal of most of the healthcare assets in 2012, it became 
apparent that there was an opportunity to consolidate science and intellectual 
property in one group, with the view of offering, over time, products which bridged 
data on basic research with data on commercial applications.
It is unclear to what extent the new owners of the business support this strategy. 
Despite the high level of debt, the company has made two acquisitions aimed at 
modernizing its research offerings: Kopernio, which is integrated into Web of Science, 
and Publons, which fits with ScholarOne, the manuscript management system. 
However, neither of these upend the company’s strategy as a neutral data analytics 
supplier to researchers and librarians. For many smaller publishers that are unable to 
compete with the investment budget of Elsevier, Clarivate offers the ideal partner to 
enhance their services. 
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Integration within Clarivate between scientific and academic research and the 
other areas of activity is less prominent. In fact, the few interviews given by Annette 
Thomas, the CEO of the Scientific and Academic Research Group, are focused on the 
core business. Nonetheless, we think that integration between core data analytics and 
intellectual property remains a significant opportunity, as it can lead to serving both 
universities when seeking deeper ties (and funding) with industry, and industry when 
looking at identifying, understanding, and supporting relevant research in its early 
stages. 
In general, we view any publisher below the size of Wiley as unlikely to have the 
financial resources to mount a major challenge to the research data analytics 
businesses of Elsevier and Clarivate. There are, however, a couple of noteworthy 
comments:
1. Holtzbrinck must decide what to do with Digital Science. The business was not 
included in the merger of Springer and Nature Publishing Group (reportedly, 
because its losses would saddle the performance of the combined entity). Digital 
Science’s original strategy was to build an open, neutral infrastructure, but that 
course is slightly changing. In part, the culture internal to Digital Science, with 
its collection of entrepreneurs pursuing their vision means that integrating the 
companies into a single, cohesive offering is very difficult. In part, Holtzbrinck 
probably does not wish to invest vast amounts of money to grow it to the point 
where it can mount a serious challenge to Elsevier or Clarivate. On the other hand, 
adding Digital Science to Springer Nature may allow them to tell a more credible 
story to investors, which may help selling an IPO which looks difficult to attempt 
again.
2. Some smaller, independent data analytics companies are also gaining traction. 
Academic Analytics is one of the most prominent, but other companies are 
also launching specific products and services targeting the academic research 
community. 
Other Publishers
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THE PRODUCTS
Compiling a map of all the products and services that the three leading research 
data analytics vendors (Clarivate, Digital Science, Elsevier) market outside libraries 
is inherently a best effort exercise (Exhibit 8). Many of the companies or businesses 
within each company rely on a large trove of data and, effectively, repackage this data 
to serve as many different purposes as possible. In other words, only ingenuity limits 
what can be sold. The Elsevier and Clarivate offerings tend to rely heavily on data they 
first collect as part of their library services: Scopus and Web of Science represent 
significant foundations for many of the services and products offered respectively by 
Elsevier and Clarivate.
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Research Intelligence solutions for universities
Clarivate Digital Science Elsevier
Exhibit 8
A map of the data tools and services offered by Clarivate, Digital Science, and Elsevier.
performance assessment
researchers profiling
researchers networking
expertise discovery
productivity analysis
identification of new trends
Identification of partners
benchmarking
funding
ad hoc consultation
results promotion
Research Intelligence for 
funders
ad hoc consultation
applications peer review 
Research Intelligence for 
governments
ad hoc consultation
Research productivity tools
Discipline-specific 
solutions
chemistry
life sciences
InCites
InCites
InCites
InCites
InCites
InCites
Professional Services
WoS Author Connect
InCites, Essential 
Science Indicators
Professional Services
InCites, Essential 
Science Indicators
Professional Services
EndNote, EndNote 
Site Licence, Kopernio, 
Converis
Dimensions
Symplectic
Dimensions
Figshare
Dimensions
Digital Science Consultancy
Dimensions
Digital Science Consultancy
Dimensions
Digital Science Consultancy
Readcube, Altmetric, 
Overleaf, BioRAFT
Labguru, BioRAFT
Pure, SciVal
Pure
Pure
Pure
SciVal
SciVal
SciVal
SciVal
Funding Institutional
Analytical services
Analytical services
Expert Lookup/
Reviewer finder
Analytical services
Mendeley, SSRN, 
PlumX
Reaxys
Source: lit search, interviews
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The map we have compiled raises several issues. It is not the purpose of this 
document to suggest or recommend solutions to the many issues posed by the 
deployment of these tools, but we believe it is important to raise at least a few 
questions for the benefit of readers. 
1. First, all three companies have targeted customers inside and outside the 
academic community. This raises an important question for universities: to what 
extent is it in their interest to share additional data with companies that will likely 
feed the data (even if in aggregate form, at least some of time) to funding bodies 
and governmental decision-makers? 
2. Second, the use of data is obviously important when assessing productivity and 
impact, but no algorithm can capture the complexity of some of the judgmental 
decisions that university administrations and departmental heads are asked to 
make. Wealthy and well-funded institutions can probably afford to spend the time 
to evaluate every individual researcher. On the other hand, institutions affected 
by limitations on budgets will be tempted to give disproportionate weight to 
tools that can be advertised outside the institution or that affect the behavior of 
governments and funding bodies. Also, each institution is inherently different in 
how it wants to weigh quality, performance, and impact. Using a standardized 
algorithm (that may not even be transparent) could lead to decisions in conflict 
with the values (and the policies) of any one institution. 
3. Third, what is the use of data within these companies once it is made available 
by research institutions? What degree of privacy is afforded to university and 
researcher data once it is uploaded to utilize the productivity tools made available? 
Is this data fed into other businesses within the same company? Is it made 
available or re-sold to third parties? What would be the response of a commercial 
vendor to a government request for disclosure or a subpoena? 
4. Fourth, some of these businesses effectively text and data mine materials 
submitted by researchers. What is the licensing agreement underlying these 
relationships? Do other researchers enjoy similar access rights? One of the issues 
brewing in the controversy around the boundaries of IP is the limitation demanded 
by many publishers to the use of third-party software for the purpose of extracting 
insights. It is debatable whether these demands are strategically sound (we 
believe they are not, at least in the case of the leading publishers) and whether 
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they make any sense in the case of mining for insights on broad themes, such as 
the emergence of new disciplines. On the other hand, we find the limitation of text 
and data mining for conducting scientific research unacceptable, full stop. If text 
and data mining can be patented, publishers should do so. If they cannot obtain a 
patent, then demanding that scientific research is conducted exclusively by using 
their tools is unreasonable.  
Once again, this is not (and is not meant to be) a comprehensive list of all the issues 
posed by the provision of data tools and services outside university libraries. It is 
also not meant to provide recommendations on possible solutions, which will be 
articulated at a later stage and in different forums. We expect the list of issues to 
grow substantially over time, as more people weigh in from their vantage points and 
based on their experience and concerns. 
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TEACHING AND 
STUDENT ACTIVITIES
In 2016, the publishing industry was finally forced to acknowledge that the poor 
performance of higher education textbook publishing was being negatively affected 
by trends that are structural, rather than cyclical, in nature.
The events of 2016 were startling: at the end of 2015, Pearson’s management 
expected U.S. higher education revenues to decline by 1 or 2%, reflecting a similar 
decline in college enrollment and flat spending per student – while holding market 
shares stable. By the end of 2016, results were much worse: organic revenue decline 
in courseware was -10%. Wiley reported even worse results: for the fiscal year (FY) 
ending in April 2016, textbooks sales declined by -15%, and for the FY ending on the 
30th April 2017 organic revenues declined by a further -13%. McGraw-Hill Education 
reported a -8.9% decline for domestic higher education revenues in the FY ending on 
the 31st December 2016. Finally, Cengage reported for the fiscal year ending on the 
31st March 2017 a revenue decline of -15% for the domestic Learning business.
The publishers entered 2017 with significant misgivings. Even if Pearson blamed 
a one-time inventory adjustment amongst bookstores for the revenue decline of 
2016, its guidance for the following year implied a further 6-7% decline in underlying 
demand for textbooks and courseware in 2017 (management indicated that revenues 
may come in between +1 and -7%, depending on stocking strategies of retailers). 
Against such dire scenarios, the -3% organic revenue decline of 2017 was almost a 
relief, and it led management to issue a slightly improved guidance for a further -6% 
decline in demand for courseware in 2018 (against a previously issued guidance 
of -6 to -7%). Once again, other publishers posted similar or even worse numbers: 
Wiley reported a -6% revenue decline for textbooks in the FY which ended on the 30th 
April 2018, McGraw-Hill Education Higher Education revenues declined by -2.8% and 
Cengage a -3.4% decline in domestic learning revenues for the FY ending on the 31st 
March 2018 (Exhibit 9).
Background - The State of the Textbook Market
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Exhibit 9
US Higher Education courseware revenue decline for selected publishers.
McGraw-Hill Education
Pearson
Wiley
Cengage
2016
-8.9%
-10.0%
-13.0%
-15.0%
2017
-2.8%
-3.0%
-6.0%
-3.4%
Source: annual reports, presentations
The continued decline of the higher education courseware business in the U.S. is 
driven by the interplay of three factors: student enrollment, pricing, and participation 
rates.
Factor 1: Student Enrollment
The first factor of student enrollment is cyclical in nature based on the economy 
(even if there are longer term trends in terms of participation). Pearson estimates that 
every 1% change (up or down) in the U.S. unemployment rate drives a 3% change (in 
the opposite direction) in the U.S. college enrollment rate. The robust labor market of 
2016 and 2017, therefore, could be expected to drive down enrollment rates in college, 
which – in fact – declined by -1.4% in 2016 and by -1.0% in 2017 (Exhibit 10). Drops 
were not equal across all categories of institutions; however, for-profit and community 
colleges continue to show above average rates of decline, while both public and 
private non-profit four-year colleges show below average rates of decline (or some 
modest growth).
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Exhibit 10
Changes in student enrollment in US colleges, 2015-2017
Four year, public
Four year, private nonprofit
Four year, for-profit
Two year, public
Overall
2016
0.8%
-0.3%
-13.7%
-2.9%
-1.7%
2017 2017
0.2%
-0.6%
-14.5%
-2.6%
-1.4%
-0.2%
-0.4%
-7.1%
-1.7%
-1.0%
Source: National Student Clearinghouse Research Center
Factor 2: Pricing
Assessing changes in average pricing is rather difficult. Contrary to trade books, 
college textbooks do not have uniform suggested retail prices. College and digital 
bookstores therefore are free to set any mark-up above the wholesale price set by 
the publisher. In addition, in the transition from print to digital, publishers can lower 
their wholesale prices to reflect lower costs, such as the savings on printing, binding, 
shipping, and warehousing costs (which account for an estimated 7% of publisher 
revenues and 9% of costs). In fact, because of the potential to sell digital materials 
directly to students, publishers could stand to increase their revenues despite lower 
prices by appropriating at least part of the estimated average 25% mark-up practiced 
by bookstores. Also, “inclusive access” (a model where a time-limited subscription 
to digital textbooks is automatically charged to students) allows publishers to 
also increase overall revenues by increasing their sell-through rate and potentially 
convincing institutions to subscribe to a broader range of content.
Student spending habits may show some impact on price changes. The annual 
student survey published by the National Association of College Stores suggests that 
student spending on textbooks has declined over recent years, thanks at least in part 
to a variety of strategies to access the materials, including textbook rentals, alternate 
editions, and used books (Exhibit 11). However, other studies suggest that students 
opting out of purchasing textbooks likely also contributes to the decline in student 
spending, which calls into question whether students are in fact better off.
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Exhibit 11
Student spending on courseware continues to decline according to some sources.
Source: National Association of College Stores
Product mix also influences realized prices. Follett explains a fairly broad range of 
options and prices: for a $100 print textbook being sold new in a college bookstore, 
the used version will command about $75, rental should cost anywhere between 
$50 and $65, digital editions will retail anywhere between $40 and $60 and custom 
editions (which are assembled exclusively for a specific campus) will retail at $30. 
Custom programs are arrangements in which the publishers produce materials that 
are specifically customized for a course by assembling chapters and articles from 
multiple sources. These materials are often offered at a steep discount, in large part 
because of the increased sell-through rate, since students are unable to seek used or 
rental copies off campus. This has a similar effect as inclusive access, and though 
different, sometimes the two approaches are combined. As the availability of lower 
cost options have proliferated over the last decade, it is easy to see how average 
spending could appear to be in decline. 
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Factor 3: Participation Rates
Student participation rates (the rate at which students buy new books) are also 
difficult to assess. The National Association of College Stores survey indicates that 
63% of college students buy new books, 56% buy used books and 25% acquire digital 
materials. This data does not paint the full picture, since most students apply a mixed 
strategy based on the available options and whether they believe they may need the 
textbook beyond completion of the class. Most publishers mention seeing market 
research pointing to about 25 to 33% of students in an average U.S. college course 
buying new books, about 50% buying used books and the balance resorting to other 
strategies (borrowing, renting, photocopying, just not using any course material, etc.)
This factor is perhaps the most controversial driver of structural change in the 
market. Until a couple of years ago, publishers maintained that student segments 
are different, and that students who buy new books are unlikely to shift to renting, 
borrowing, or even buying used books. Since the sharp decline in 2016, however, 
publishers started to review their beliefs. Pearson’s management, for example, has 
been conceding for about two years that renting is indeed affecting demand for new 
books. 
In general, there is a sense that publishers have limited knowledge of the drivers of 
student behavior, and that much of what determines how a student will behave is still 
unknown. In part, this limited knowledge is the legacy of a cultural bias among the 
publishers, who have always viewed college professors as their true customer, as they 
are the ultimate decision makers responsible for adopting textbooks. This attitude 
will change; for example, Pearson’s Chief Strategy Officer comes from Kantar, WPP’s 
market research unit and is likely to make a major effort to change the culture of the 
company and spend more resources to understand students and their needs and 
choices (in order to more effectively market to them). 
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In 2017, for the first time Pearson’s North American digital higher education revenues 
were higher than print revenues. For McGraw-Hill Education, digital learning solutions 
accounted for 62% of revenues in 2017. At Cengage, in the FY ended on the 31st 
March 2018, digital solutions accounted for 53% of learning revenues. While these 
numbers still leave most students in most courses using print materials once the 
used and physical rental markets are taken into consideration, it still means that the 
rising adoption of digital solutions in the years to come will generate vast amounts of 
data on students and the teaching performance of faculty. 
Publishers are responding to these negative trends by actively supporting “inclusive 
access.” In its simplest form, inclusive access is an arrangement where a digital 
subscription to required course materials is included when students enroll in a 
course by a price pre-negotiated with the publisher. The institution may recover the 
cost of these subscriptions by directly billing student accounts for each applicable 
course or by building the cost of course materials into tuition and fees (the latter is 
less common right now, but is likely to grow with ongoing state and federal lobbying 
efforts by the publishing industry). While an opt-out mechanism is typically made 
available for students who wish to purchase their course materials on their own (it is 
required by U.S. federal regulations under 34 C.F.R. Sec. 668.164(c)), processes are far 
from streamlined and students may miss the narrow window of opportunity to opt-
out. Some inclusive access programs include a flat-rate subscription to a publisher’s 
catalog of digital materials. Theoretically, students could lower their cost of acquiring 
books across courses by effectively replacing individual purchases with an annual 
subscription. However, much remains to be seen.   
Consortia like Unizin are beginning to act as aggregators around the inclusive access 
model, negotiating lower rates across publishers so that students do not have to pay 
for individual subscriptions (akin to how Spotify or Apple Music aggregate content 
across major music companies and make it available to consumers through a single 
subscription, instead of forcing consumers to subscribe to the catalog of each 
recorded music company). From the publishers’ perspective, the combination of 
lowering costs (because digital materials replace print books), adding users (because 
very few students opt out and because there are no books feeding the used book 
market), and the potential to reduce distribution costs by circumventing bookstores 
The Rise of “Inclusive Access“
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means that the economics of these aggregated subscriptions can be equal or better. 
On its face, some argue that inclusive access is a win-win situation for both 
publishers and students: equal or higher profits for publishers and lower, more 
predictable spending for students. However, things are not as simple as they appear, 
particularly for students. All the students who lower their spending by reselling books, 
renting them, sharing them, or by checking them out of libraries may not be better 
off (and the lowest spenders will be worse off), depending on actual prices for new 
and used books and the cost of inclusive access deals. There is also no mechanism 
preventing publishers from resuming their historical rate of price increases once the 
model becomes widespread. Most important for the purposes of the issues raised 
in this document, once students transition to digital materials it enables both their 
institutions and the commercial vendors to collect vast amounts of data on them: 
their physical location when they use them, their study habits, their learning profile, 
and granular knowledge on their performance. This poses significant privacy issues, 
and – potentially – legal liabilities which could become, at some point, very grave. 
Inclusive access is beginning to draw legal challenges. In January 2019, a used 
bookseller filed a complaint against Trident Technical College (TTC) in South Carolina. 
The suit alleges that TTC made it hard for students to determine the price of inclusive 
access materials and for making opt out procedures difficult or unfeasible. The court 
documents also state that the inclusive access contract with Pearson required TTC 
to meet a quota in order to be guaranteed a discount, which illustrates the kind of 
Faustian bargain these deals can entail. The contract pits the financial interest of the 
institution against the financial interests of students (the institution loses money if 
too many students opt out) and also the academic freedom of faculty (the institution 
loses money if too few faculty assign Pearson materials). It also means that the 
institution cannot be sure of the ultimate price they will pay at the time they sign 
the contract. This type of deal is emblematic of the concerns that are raised in this 
document.
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THE COMPANIES
The Basics
Pearson is the remnant of what used to be a very large British conglomerate. The 
company started as a construction company in 1844, but by 1920 it had exited the 
construction business and started to diversify into finance (it owned a stake in Lazard) 
media and non-media assets (Chateaux Latour, the Madama Tussaud operations). 
Media assets included a chain of newspapers managed within the Westminster Press 
Group, the Financial Times and a 50% stake in The Economist, Penguin (a trade book 
publisher), various TV production businesses (which were later sold to RTL). All these 
assets have been divested totally or partially over time (like in the case of Penguin), 
leaving the education publishing assets at the core of what the company does. 
Longman was the initial core of Pearson’s education business. Over time, the 
company acquired, among others, Scott Foreman, the textbook business of Harper 
Collins, Prentice Hall, Addison Wesley, and the textbook business of Simon & 
Schuster. The acquisition of NES (National Education Systems) in 2006 effectively set 
Pearson on the path to transform itself into a digital learning company. Since 2011, 
as revenue growth started to falter, Pearson has been sizing down its educational 
portfolio as well. 
At its core, the company aims at participating in education sectors that it expects to 
transition to full digital delivery of content and services, enabling itself to add value 
to content through data analytics. Thus, the company decided to exit the U.S. K-12 
courseware sector, despite holding a leading market share. Management, in the end, 
decided that financial constraints, the opposition from segments of the educational 
community, and the highly-decentralized nature of U.S. school districts when it comes 
to technology decisions means that digital transformation of U.S. schools would 
either not happen or happen in ways that would make it difficult to build a profitable 
digital business for Pearson. 
This leaves higher education at the core of Pearson’s educational activities in the U.S., 
Pearson
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Exhibit 12
North American Higher Ed accounts for 31% of all Pearson’s revenues.
Source: Annual report, presentations
with another assessment business that is smaller and significantly less profitable 
than the higher education business. The company does not disclose operating 
margins by line of business, but we think that higher education should be a low 
twenties operating margin business, vs. low teens for assessment. 
North American Higher Ed revenues account for 26% of Pearson’s total revenues of 
£4.513/$5.972 billion and for 40% of North American revenues. In addition, Higher Ed 
services (which include activities like running the online activities of several colleges 
and universities, account for another 5% of total revenues and almost 8% of North 
American revenues (Exhibit 12). 
The company does not disclose the profitability of individual business lines. 
North America recorded an operating profit margin of 13.5% in 2017. Historically, 
we estimate that higher education operated at an operating profit margin in the 
low twenties, while school courseware would operate at mid to high teens and 
assessment at low teens. These margins have declined in recent years as demand 
43
 2019 Landscape Analysis
contracted across the board. 
The Issues
Pearson has been the only publicly listed leading textbook publisher for several 
years. For many years, the main competitors (McGraw-Hill Educations and Cengage) 
struggled to perform adequately. In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008, at 
first Pearson enjoyed a grace period, as U.S. Higher Ed enrollment grew because of 
the weakening labor market, and K-12 textbooks budgets could still benefit from the 
lag between the downturn in the economy and pre-approved spending decisions. 
By 2011-12, however, as the labor market started to show signs of improvement, 
enrollment in U.S. colleges started to peak, and school districts pulled back spending. 
In 2012, Apollo Group (a private equity firm) acquired McGraw-Hill Education, while in 
2014, Cengage reorganized after an organized bankruptcy. New management teams 
started to improve the competitive performance of both companies at the exact 
time when the market started to decelerate, aggravating the performance issues of 
Pearson.
Because of several profit warnings, the share price of Pearson has undergone a 
substantial decline (and a recovery in recent months). The stock peaked in March 
2015 at £14.92; by January 2016, it had declined to £6.90 and, by September 2017, to 
£5.69. Since then, it has recovered to £9.17 thanks to more stable performance and 
the decision to dispose of several assets, as well as reduce costs aggressively.
Management has been very vocal, at least with the financial community, about 
the declining value of print-based textbooks in the long run, to the point that many 
investors interpreted the message as “the long-term value of the print textbook 
business is zero”. Whether management meant to convey this message is irrelevant; 
Pearson has educated the financial community that only digital courseware and data 
analytic services will have value in the future. Effectively, Pearson is now committed 
to driving the fastest possible adoption of digital courseware, and exiting business 
where this transition is unlikely or impossible.
Pearson has explicitly highlighted, in some of its investor presentations, how data 
analytics can affect outcomes for students. Very clearly, management believes that 
digital tools are not just aimed at the face value benefits of streamlining learning, 
increasing faculty productivity, and lowering costs. A combination of student profiling 
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through adaptive learning tools (which identify the best way to teach to different 
segments of students), and reporting (through the analysis of study and testing 
performance of students) is expected to transform schools with very large enrollment 
numbers, where it is less cost effective to monitor individual students. Pearson’s 
strategy of focusing its textbooks on institutions with large numbers of students 
and a lower rate of student achievement naturally leads to developing and marketing 
these tools. 
In March 2013, McGraw-Hill closed the sale of its education business to Apollo, a 
private equity company for $2.4 billion in cash. In the nine months before the sale was 
announced, the company had achieved a 15.8% operating margin, while EBITDA in 
2013 was negative (making any multiple not meaningful). 
McGraw-Hill Education operates across higher education, K-12, and professional 
markets, but is very dependent higher education, which accounts for 41.5% of 
its revenues (Exhibit 13). The company exited the assessment business in 2015, 
effectively going in the opposite direction of Pearson, which has decided to abandon 
K-12 courseware and stay in assessment.
Apollo has hoped for a long time to IPO the business to exit the investment. Net debt 
at the end of 2017 stood at $1.832 billion, implying a net debt/EBITDA ratio of 8.5x. 
An IPO that would raise fresh funds and pay down debt would be quite a relief to 
management, but so far has proven impossible to pull off. The company filed papers 
in 2015 and again in 2016, but market conditions have prevented Apollo from carrying 
out this step. The company has spent about $700 million in technology since Apollo 
acquired it, and this demand on its cash flow shows in the net debt, which peaked in 
2016 at $1.927 billion, rising from $1.242 billion at the end of 2013 (the year of the 
acquisition). 
McGraw-Hill Education
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Exhibit 13
Higher Ed accounts for 41.5% of McGraw-Hill Education revenues
Source: Annual reports
Cengage is the successor company to the old Thomson Learning (Thomson 
education business), which was sold to APAX (a London-based private equity 
company) and Omers (an Ontario pension fund) in 2007. The company is largely 
focused on the higher education market. Its learning segment accounts for almost 
65% of revenues, and Gale, the primary sources business which sells mostly to 
colleges and universities, accounts for another 16% (Exhibit 14). 
Cengage is a pioneer in inclusive access and Cengage Unlimited, its full catalog 
subscription, was the first full offering of this kind. Cengage was also the first major 
publisher to offer a product branded as open educational resources (OER), although 
the content is still purchased by students enrolled in a course. In recent years, 
Cengage has been the most visible of the major companies in slashing their prices 
and reframing their products as a solution to the high cost of textbooks (although 
Cengage
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Exhibit 14
Higher education accounts for almost two thirds of Cengage’s revenues (even 
excluding Gale’s higher education revenues).
Source: Annual reports
they continue to offer traditional products as well). Anecdotal evidence has revealed 
aggressive marketing tactics for Cengage Unlimited, including contacting student 
governments to request help lobbying the administration to purchase the full catalog 
subscription.
Cengage struggled significantly in the years after the Apax/Omers acquisition. It 
tried to improve its performance by raising prices aggressively, but it could not 
avoid a reorganization and an organized bankruptcy in 2013, with the goal of 
shrinking the $5.8 billion of net debt it had at the time. The original acquisition cost 
Apax $7.75 billion, to which must be added the $750 million to acquire the college 
textbook business of Houghton Mifflin in 2008 and the textbook business of National 
Geographic in 2011 for an undisclosed amount. In the end, the debt burden proved 
too onerous, and the restructuring allowed the company to bring it back to acceptable 
levels. As of the 31st March 2018, the company had a net debt of $1,932.3 million. 
Since the adjusted EBITDA was $298.5 million, the net debt/equity ratio is a high, but 
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still manageable at 6.5x. 
The long-term exit plan for the owners of Cengage is not clear. An IPO would be 
subject to the same investor sentiment which has prevented McGraw-Hill Education 
to complete its own IPO. An industry sale could run into anti-trust concerns, since the 
three largest publishers hold a substantial share of the market and any consolidation 
among them would raise concerns.
It is worthwhile to note that there are other, smaller publishers in the Courseware 
business. Wiley, MacMillan, and SAGE all have higher education textbook businesses, 
often with one or more areas of specific focus (for example, Macmillan has an 
historic focus on the social sciences and humanities, and Wiley has always been very 
visible in business). OpenStax, a nonprofit open textbook publisher operating out of 
Rice University, has successfully launched a set of introductory for high enrollment 
courses. These textbooks are openly licensed, free online, and available in print at a 
low cost, and are also backed by a marketplace of optional supplemental materials.
Estimating market share among publishers has been difficult. Higher education 
publishers report their revenues to the AAP (Association of American Publishers), 
which aggregates and circulates them. The consistency of the reporting has been 
called into question, however, in part because there is no clarity about whether 
all of the publishers are consistently reporting their courseware revenues (some 
may include sales of teaching materials, while others may only report courseware 
shipments). Additionally, revenues are reported at the time of shipment (minus 
provisions for estimated returns), so publishers could potentially inflate revenues 
in any one quarter or year by shipping larger numbers of books during that time (or 
lowering their estimates for returns). Finally, as publishers scrambling to ink deals 
with institutions that trade higher sell-through rates in exchange for temporary 
discounts, revenues may not be the most reliable indicator of market share at this 
point of transition. 
Other Publishers
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THE PRODUCTS
The decline of print textbooks is forcing every publisher to move towards digital 
content. Once content is digitized and delivered, however, it opens vast possibilities 
to collect and analyze data. While data can be used for good, there are also manifold 
challenges that institutions have only begun to grapple with.
Digital products include not only textbooks, but also homework systems, assessment 
tools, adaptive content customized based on the learning profiles of students, 
standalone platforms, Learning Management Systems, lecture capture, etc. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that these systems built and maintained by publishers capture 
massive amounts of data about student and faculty behavior that go beyond what is 
necessary for accomplishing their core objectives (i.e. improving student outcomes). 
Institutions, faculty and students should think about the accumulation and use of data 
collected and retained by schools and commercial vendors.
Student and Faculty Privacy
Digital tools collect and analyze data in a wide variety of ways, including to establish 
what is a student’s learning profile, where and when students access content or 
complete homework, what resources are used to complete tasks, how long it takes 
to complete individual exercises, which digital library materials have they accessed, 
and so on. While publishers may justify collecting this information for the purposes of 
improving educational outcomes, there are also serious questions about the potential 
risks. This data, if hacked, re-sold, or surrendered to governments without judicial 
review, it can be used to classify students, screen them for employment or access to 
graduate education, infer their political views, and even map their network of friends, 
mentors, and followers. While there are federal and state regulations concerning 
student privacy, some (such as FERPA) have not been updated in decades and cannot 
be assumed to cover all possible uses.
While many students today have a choice between acquiring a textbook in print or 
digital form, the trends towards restricting access to digital products is unmistakable: 
The Challenges Ahead
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digital content lowers costs for publishers and enables the collection of data, and 
helps universities increase productivity and slow their cost inflation. For example, 
digital study guides supplementing digital textbooks allow colleges to reduce the 
number of teaching assistants required, particularly for large introductory classes. Are 
students better off if these gains in productivity are inadvertently purchased with vast 
amounts of their data?
Another area of concern is the content laid out in the Terms of Use of digital 
textbooks, which may often be signed by the student, rather than the institution. Since 
it is the decision of a faculty member – an employee of the institution – to assign a 
digital textbook, it is therefore a foregone conclusion that students must accept a 
publisher’s terms in order to access their course materials. Generally speaking, it is 
standard for terms of use for digital products to include a clause allowing the provider 
to change the terms at any time without notice, possibly retroactively. Faced with 
increasing financial pressures and tempting opportunities to monetize data, could 
publishers resist?
The risks to student and faculty privacy are significant: they range from hacking 
to unmonitored re-sale of data to third parties. Could commercial vendors find 
themselves selling student data, even inadvertently, to the next Cambridge Analytica? 
Would commercial vendors resist government requests for data? Would universities 
resist requests for selective data from prospective employers, possibly dangling a 
greater number of hires from the institution if they could (for example) only know 
how students answered a specific set of questions or which students have desirable 
collaboration patterns? Would students read the fine print before sharing their data 
with an “app” offering to predict their dream job or lifetime earning potential? 
Algorithms and Analytics
Also, the algorithms themselves used by publishers are notoriously not transparent, 
raising a spectrum of ethical questions. For example, how do adaptive learning 
algorithms conclude that an individual should be served one of several types of 
customized content? Are all student profiles considered and valued equally, or are 
systems effectively classifying students on the basis of perceived abilities and 
tendencies, handicapping some even before they complete a class? Numerous 
examples in recent news stories illustrate how algorithms can be influenced by the 
unconscious bias of the humans who design them, which can manifest in forms of 
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unintended discrimination. In a higher education context where algorithms are trusted 
with increasingly important decisions, the lack of transparency raises not only ethical 
concerns, but also potential legal exposure. 
It is worth noting that publishers are not the only vendors of data analytics to 
universities. Many (if not most) colleges are using data analytics to varying degrees 
in the recruitment process, and there are many questions in terms of fairness raised 
using non-transparent algorithms. Are algorithms perpetuating, even involuntarily, 
biases based on ethnicity, geography, occupation, and likelihood that students or their 
families turn into donors, etc.? 
It is very important to emphasize once again that this report is not intended to take 
an adversarial view about the deployment of data analytics in academic institutions. 
We acknowledge that the issues posed by data are here to stay. We would strongly 
recommend that academic institutions analyze separately the issues posed by 
metrics (“what is being measured”) from those posed by algorithms (“how is this 
being measured”). Of course, the two categories feed on each other. For example, 
it can become easy to measure performance by using what is made available by 
vendors and can be procured easily, instead of devoting resources to evaluate hard to 
quantify (or just to collect) elements of performance. But metrics and algorithms pose 
very different issues and should be addressed separately. 
Academic institutions need to take control of metrics. It is their own responsibility 
– and theirs alone – to ensure, for example, that faculty are evaluated on the basis 
of multiple factors. These factors may include the impact factor of journals that 
published their research, but may also extend and weigh appropriately, for example, 
collaboration, collegiality, management of junior staff and team work. Of course, 
these other elements may be complex or expensive to gather and analyze, can 
be ambiguous and leave room to criticism. We are not advocating that academic 
institutions choose any specific metric over another – just that they deliberately 
address which should be used in the evaluation of faculty, rather than just using those 
that are easily available through commercial vendors.
The Future
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Algorithms, on the other hand, do not need to be developed by each academic 
institution, just so long as they are transparent and can be analyzed and properly 
understood. “Black box” algorithms used in academic settings may contain any 
number of issues that are incompatible with the values of the institution. But, as long 
as the algorithms remain hidden, there is no way to know, and – as many anecdotical 
reports indicate – biases can easily be built into them, even inadvertently.
We do see some academic institutions actively opposing the use of data analytics. 
For example, the University of Ghent in Belgium announced in December 2018 that 
it would change how it evaluates its faculty. In the announcement, Rector Rik Van de 
Walle wrote – among other things:
“No more procedures and processes with always the same templates, metrics 
and criteria which lump everyone together” and “The model must provide a 
response to the complaint of many young professors that quantitative parameters 
are predominant in the evaluation process. The well-known and overwhelming 
‘publication pressure’ is the most prominent exponent of this. Ghent University is 
deliberately choosing to step out of the rat race between individuals, departments 
and universities. We no longer wish to participate in the ranking of people”. 
This is a courageous and daring course, and we acknowledge that most North 
American academic institutions may not be ready to abandon data and data analytics 
in order to inform decisions outright. Our goal is to ensure that institutions approach 
these decisions deliberately and in a manner consistent with their values.
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PRELIMINARY 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The goal of this document is to describe the current landscape of publishers moving 
into core activities of universities. Actively formulating and implementing solutions to 
these problems is complex but critically important, and something SPARC intends to 
work closely with the community on. However, we think it is worthwhile to conclude 
this document with a recap of some of the options for action currently available to the 
academic community.
In general, we think that solutions must be tailored to individual colleges or 
universities, although some of them would likely require a significant number of 
institutions to work together. For any institutional context, the key drivers will be 
a mix of cultural elements (how centralized or decentralized are decisions? What 
is the appetite for establishing deep ties to commercial vendors?) and financial 
considerations (what are the spending priorities? What magnitude of savings does 
leadership hope to get from the deployment of data analytics? Would targeting 
significant revenues from IP represent an acceptable decision? What kind of 
companies are off-limits to partnerships because of their activities?) We aim to offer 
a menu of choices and illustrations of best practices, rather than prescribing a single 
course of action. That said, we think that there are two different sets of solutions. 
Risk Mitigation
We think of the first set as risk mitigation solutions. These are actions aimed at 
protecting colleges and universities from the unintended consequences of deploying a 
rising number of data analytic tools and collecting larger and more intrusive amounts 
and categories of data. 
These actions could include establishing detailed data policies and mechanisms 
for ensuring compliance. These policies could demand that institutions maintain 
the ownership of data, that terms and conditions of contracts with commercial 
vendors are not covered by non-disclosure agreements (i.e. open procurement), that 
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algorithms used by vendors are made fully transparent, that results from their usage 
are portable (i.e. that institutions maintain the right to historic output series, in order 
to facilitate switching to other vendors), that data is not re-sold to third parties (or at 
least is not resold without the explicit consent of the institution), and that data sets 
that are deemed particularly sensitive are not turned over to government agencies 
without first resorting to the appropriate court, etc. 
We also think that risk mitigation requires appropriate organizational decisions. 
Some institutions may opt for coordination group or task forces, while others may 
decide that presidents or provosts may want to identify individuals tasked with both 
issuing data policies, monitoring execution, and helping individual offices negotiate 
with vendors and adjudicate possible conflicts of interest across different parts of 
the institution.  Over time, we think that the latter solution will prevail in most complex 
institutions, but each one will have to determine its own transition pace. 
Weighing Trade-Offs
A second set of solutions will require individual institutions to decide among the 
many trade-offs. For example, using data analytics to drive the admissions process 
is less expensive than hiring a large staff, and institutions may choose different levels 
of human intervention to balance their budgets and oversight priorities. Similarly, 
research institutions must balance an aggressive policy of commercial exploitation of 
intellectual property to supplement funding with faculty demands for independence 
and funding of basic research and disciplines with limited commercial upside. Some 
institutions will support community solutions to some of these issues, while others 
will be skeptical. Our goal is to offer a broad array of detailed solutions and to help, 
when needed, individual institutions think through the issues.
In conclusion, we believe there is still time for the academic community to act, and 
now is the time to do it. By taking stock of the situation, asking the right questions, 
and choosing the right course of action, the academic community can prevent itself 
from winding up in a position where it is obliged to follow a path out of its control and 
harmful to its future.
